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Institutions and Social Structures: Some Clarifications 
 
Abstract. The objective of this paper is to continue the important task of 
clarifying two terms that are central to a great deal of social science, but 
often mired in confusion, namely,  ‘institutions’ and ‘social structures’. 
The opening part of the paper uses recent insights in contemporary 
sociological and (Institutional) economic theory to explore the similarities 
between social structures and institutions, especially in the relation 
between them as a couple, and human agents. The second and third 
parts shift from exploring similarities to exploring differences. Drawing 
largely on the work of Hodgson, whose work can be considered current 
‘best practice’ on institutions; part two considers properties that are 
specific to institutions. Drawing largely on an important historico-
theoretical overview of over a century of writing on social structures by 
Lopez and Scott, (but departing from them in significant ways) part three 
considers properties that are specific to social structures.  
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Introduction 
 
Whilst the terms ‘institutions’ and ‘social structures’1 feature extensively in 
many social scientific disciplines, there is more than a little confusion about 
what each term means and how they relate to one another. I am not the only 
one who is concerned. Writers like Battiera (2006); Hodgson (2002, 2003, 
2004, 2006); Jessop & Nielsen (2003); Lawson (2003); Nielsen (2006); 
Rogers-Hollingsworth & Muller (2002); Searle (2005) and Portes (2005) have 
recently sought to tighten up our understanding of the term ‘institution’. Archer 
(2000); Elder-Vass (2006, 2007a, 2007b); Jackson (2007); Lewis (2000); 
Lewis & Runde (2007); Lopez & Scott (2000); Scott (2001); and Porpora 
(1998, 2007); have done something similar for the term ‘social structures’. 
Although clarity is occasionally gained from the context in which the terms are 
used, this is not always the case. Allow me to exemplify.   
 
Perhaps the most common way of dealing with the relationship between 
institutions and social structures is to treat institutions as kinds of social 
structures. For Hodgson: ‘Institutions’ are the kind of structures that matter 
most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of social life (Hodgson (2006: 
2, passim). Lawson makes a similar point, writing: Some ‘structures are 
actually set up as institutions’ (Lawson 2004: 10). For (Wells 1970: 3) ‘Social 
institutions form an element in a more general concept known as social 
structure’. Whilst there is a sense in which institutions and social structures 
are similar kinds of things, as we will see below, there is also a sense in which 
they are different. Treating institutions as kinds of social structures 
emphasises the fact that they have similarities, but tends to hide their 
important differences. 
 
One extremely common notion of institutions and social structures is to treat 
them not only as social practices, but as patterned practices, particularly 
regularities of some kind. Whilst Jessop and Nielsen (2003: 1) disagree with 
the notion, they are probably correct to observe that: ‘In general the social 
                                                 
1 I will not make the distinction between social and cultural structures. On this issue, see Archer (1995).  
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science literature tends to regard institutions as social practices that are 
regularly and continuously repeated’ and I would extend this to include social 
structures. In short, this confuses the conditions of action with the action itself. 
This does seem to be a remarkable misunderstanding given that Giddens’s 
Structuration theory and more recently the transformational and 
morphogentic/morphostatic approach advocated by critical realists, both of 
which firmly reject this common notion,  have been available for decades. I 
will return to this later. 
 
The term ‘institution’ can be used to refer to very different things like: money, 
the family, religion, property, markets, the state, education, sport and 
medicine, language, law, systems of weights and measures and table 
manners. This ignores important differences. The ‘institution’ of money, for 
example, does not contain human beings, whereas the ‘institution’ of the 
family clearly does. Are they different kinds of institution, or is one of them not 
really an institution? For Schmid and Schomann (1994: 19) ‘Labour market 
policy’ is an institution whilst for Schmid (1994: 3-5) ‘early retirement, further 
education, retraining and regulation of working hours, trade unions, labour 
and social security laws, labour market programs, codetermination, and 
collective bargaining’ are all institutions. The problem here is that the term 
‘institution’ can easily become a catch all term to refer to virtually any kind of 
social arrangement that is drawn upon by agents. Indeed, Portes (2005) 
refers to this as the ‘institutions are everything approach’. Furthermore, in one 
place Schmid (1994: 3) claims: ‘Institutions steer and regulate labour markets 
in a variety of ways,’ which implies labour markets are not institutions. Yet a 
page later claims thinks a better explanation is available by ‘perceiving the 
labour market as a social institution’, which implies labour markets are 
institutions. Whilst it is possible to conceive of the labour market as an 
institution that is embedded within other institutions, it is unclear what labour 
markets and industrial relations systems have in common that allows them 
both to be described as institutions. Furthermore, it is also possible to 
conceive of the labour market as an institution embedded within social 
structures, which raises the thorny issue of the nature of the relationship 
between institutions and social structures just noted.  
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The term ‘social structure’ can be used in many ways and, as Porpora (2007: 
195) notes: ‘there continues to be a certain blurriness in the way we speak of 
social structure’. The term can be used negatively, to refer to those social 
phenomena such as ‘rules, relations, positions, processes, systems, values, 
meanings and the like that do not reduce to human behaviour’ (Lawson 2003: 
181, emphasis added). But because there are many things that do not reduce 
to human behaviour, this definition is difficult to operationalise. Moreover, 
neither social structures nor institutions are reducible to human behaviour, so 
on this usage, their differences remain hidden. In a similar vein, and by 
emphasising the first word of the pair, ‘social structure’ can be used to refer to 
anything that is the result of human action, as opposed to some naturally 
occurring phenomenon. The term ‘social structure’ can be used analogously 
in an ‘architectural’ sense in cases where we refer to the structure of a 
market, an industry or organisation; or to the way a market, an industry or 
organisation is structured. It can be used to refer to specific phenomenon like 
the structure of social class or the gender regime. In contrast, it can also be 
used to refer to general phenomena, where it acts as a place-holder for a 
series of un-named ‘structural’ phenomena like rules, conventions, norms, 
resources, mechanisms and so on.2 None of these ways of using the term are 
exactly wrong, and in many cases the meaning can be derived from the 
context. But the term ‘social structure’ can also be used in a more precise, 
and theoretically elaborated, way. Lopez and Scott’s (2000) trawl through over 
a century of sociological theory identified three broad, and theoretically 
elaborated, uses of the term which they refer to as institutional, embodied and 
                                                 
2 I make no attempt to engage with the (incorrect) way some postmodernists and poststructuralists use 
the term, which is to reduce social structure to ideas, language or discourse. Two examples should 
suffice to explicate this position. ‘For postmodernists, it is the explanation itself that creates order, gives 
structure to experience. Structure is the meaning given to experience. Structure is immanent in the 
subject not in the object, in the observer not the observed…Poststructuralists conclude that there are no 
real structures that give order to human affairs, but that the construction of order (of sense making) by 
people is what gives rise to structure. Structure is the explanation itself, that which makes sense, not 
that which gives sense. It follows from this that structure cannot be seen as determining action because 
it is not real and transcendent, but a product of the human mind (Jackson and Carter 2000: 41 & 43, 
emphasis original). ‘Organization is a structure, but only when structure is recognized to be an effect of 
language’ (Westwood & Linstead 2001: 5). Neither will I engage in debate over Harre’s social 
constructivist notion of social structures – see May & Williams (2000) Harre (2002); Strydon (2002); and 
Carter (2002). 
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relational structures. I will argue below that only relational structures can be 
considered bone fide social structures, and that institutional and embodied 
structures are very similar, if not identical, to what many would call institutions. 
 
Finally, when discussing social structures and institutions, some writers also 
mention terms like habits, rules, conventions, norms, values, roles, laws, 
regulations, practices, customs, routines, procedures, precedents and so on 
as if they were similar things. Unfortunately, ambiguity in the understanding of 
these concepts can easily transpose itself to ambiguity in the understanding of 
social structures and institutions. Rutherford (1994: 92) for example, 
considers ‘habits, routines, social conventions, social norms’ as types of rules. 
In doing this, however, he conflates properties that should be associated with 
human agency, (i.e. habits) with properties that should be associated with 
institutions (i.e. conventions and norms). He furthermore makes the common 
mistake of confusing the conditions that make action possible (i.e. 
conventions and norms) with the subsequent actions (i.e. routines), something 
I noted above.   
 
The objective of this paper, then, is to continue the important task of clarifying 
the meaning of ‘institutions’ and ‘social structures’ by drawing upon recent 
insights in contemporary sociological and (Institutional) economic theory. The 
opening part of the paper uses these insights to explore the similarities 
between social structures and institutions, especially in the relation between 
them as a couple, and human agents. The second and third parts shift from 
exploring similarities to exploring differences. Drawing largely on the work of 
Hodgson, whose work can be considered current ‘best practice’ on 
institutions; part two considers properties that are specific to institutions. 
Drawing largely on an important historico-theoretical overview of over a 
century of writing on social structures by Lopez and Scott, (but departing from 
them in significant ways) part three considers properties that are specific to 
structures.  
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1. The similarities between social structures and institutions vis-à-vis 
agents 
Hodgson’s (2004: 179-181) summarisation of contemporary social ontology is 
a good starting point because it obviates the need to repeat arguments that, if 
not widely known, are readily available – although I make three slight 
alterations. Where Hodgson refers only to ‘social structures’ I refer to ‘social 
structures and institutions’. I add the first point (a) although it is recognised 
elsewhere by Hodgson. Because reconstitutive downward causation is a 
property of institutions, and not social structures, I refrain from listing it here 
and will return to it in more depth in section two. 
 
a) Ontic differentiation between agents and social structures and 
institutions. Human agents, and social structures and institutions are 
different kinds of things. Clearly, they are mutually supportive, 
recursive, and constitute an unbreakable unity: but this is a unity in 
difference.3 
 
b) The dependence of social structures and institutions upon agents. 
Social structures and institutions exist only via the intentional and 
unintentional actions of human agents.  
 
c) The rejection of methodological and ontological individualism. Social 
structures and institutions are irreducible, in an ontological and/or an 
explanatory sense, to individuals. 
 
d) The dependence of agents on social structures and institutions. For 
their socialization, survival and interaction, human agents depend upon 
social structures and institutions, which can change their behaviour.  
 
e) The rejection of methodological and ontological collectivism. Individual 
actions are irreducible, in an ontological and explanatory sense, to 
                                                 
3 Compare this with Schmid & Schomann (1994: 11) who claim ‘institutions are part of the preference 
structure of individuals’.  
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social structures. This will become important later on when structural 
determinism is mentioned, because this erroneous doctrine results 
precisely from reducing individual actions and intentions to social 
structures. 
 
f) The temporal priority of social structures and institutions over any one 
agent. Social structures pre-exist human action. Social structures can 
be changed, but the starting point is not of our choosing.  
 
Holding to this basic social ontology allows us to make a very important three-
fold distinction between: (i) agents, (ii) social structures and institutions, and 
(iii) actions or outcomes of agents interacting with social structures and 
institutions. Figure 1, places the various terms related to social structures and 
institutions (mentioned above) under three headings: agents, social structures 
and institutions, and actions.  
 
Human agents Social structuresand Institutions 
Actions or
Outcomes
Powers  Rules  Practices 
Dispositions Conventions Routines 
Capacities Norms Precedents
Capabilities Values  
Habits    Roles   
Tacit skills  Laws  
Non-tacit skills Regulations  
 Procedures  
 Customs  
 
Fig 1. Differentiating between agents, social structures and institutions, and outcomes or 
actions 
 
Human agents are emergent entities with an internal make up that provides 
them with a set of dispositions, capacities or powers. Whilst these powers are 
rooted in biology and neuro-physiology, they are irreducible to them as they 
also require input from the social world. The power to engage in habitual 
action, or to reason, are examples of the kind of power I have in mind here. 
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Recognising habits as properties of human agents, makes it easy to see what 
is wrong with Rutherford’s exposition above.  
 
To grasp the distinction between (ii) social structures and institutions, and (iii) 
action, we need to turn to social theory. Bhaskar and, more recently, Archer, 
have updated Giddens’s influential Structuration approach, to provide a 
sophisticated account of the interaction between agency and structure, which 
Bhaskar refers to as the Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA) and 
Archer’s refers to as the morphogentic/morphostatic approach.4 The 
observant reader might notice a slippage in terminology here. The ‘agency-
structure’ framework has somehow been transposed into an ‘agency-structure 
and institution’ framework. Whilst this might appear to be misleading, there is, 
arguably, nothing wrong with this exposition. What is going on here is that we 
are using that important aspect of social structures and institutions that make 
them similar, namely, they are both phenomena that are drawn, reproduced 
and transformed, upon by human agents. Allow me to exemplify.  
 
In order to undertake (even the most insignificant) social action, agents have 
no choice but to (consciously and/or unconsciously) engage with social 
structures and/or institutions that pre-exist them. To hold a conversation, 
agents have to engage with the institutional rules of grammar, and the 
convention of how far to stand from the interlocutor. To enter paid 
employment, agents have to engage with the social structure of class. By 
engaging with these institutions and/or structures, agents reproduce (hence 
morphostasis) or transform (hence morphogenesis) these structures and/or 
institutions and, are themselves reproduced or transformed. Social structures 
and institutions are different kinds of things than the human agents that 
reproduce and transform them, although each is necessary for the 
transformation or reproduction of the other. Social structures and institutions 
are the conditions of human action, they make human action possible; but 
they are not actions and so cannot be patterns of actions, although they may 
                                                 
4 Bhaskar’s (1989) TMSA has been elaborated upon by Archer. See Archer (1998) for a succinct 
overview of this approach, and Stones (2005) for a recent attempt to reconcile the work of Giddens with 
that of critical realists like Archer. 
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make such patterns possible. It is now easy to see that some things are 
actions, that is, the outcome of agents engaging with structures and 
institutions. Practices, routines and precedents are, arguably, outcomes in the 
form of patterns of actions that can be observed. They are probably what we 
have in mind when we say things like: ‘John routinely treats his female 
employees as if they were idiots’; ‘the practice around here is to buy cakes on 
your birthday’ or ‘Sue set the precedent of leaving early on Friday’. In these 
cases, agents are drawing upon a rule, convention, norm, value or whatever.  
  
2. Institutions 
 
The Routledge Dictionary of Economics (Rutherford 2000) defines institutions 
as: ‘(1) An organization…(2) A system of property rights. (3) A norm of 
behaviour. (4) A decision making unit. (5) A type of contract’. This definition is 
probably correct (only) in the sense that this is how institutions are commonly 
defined; but the definition is incorrect in the sense that this common usage is 
confused and confusing. 
 
In a world where the intentions and actions of others are, typically, unknown 
and unknowable, a particular group of phenomena play a significant part in 
facilitating the co-ordination of our intentions and actions, at least to a degree 
that allows society to continue to exist.5 This group consists of rules, 
conventions and habits, although sometimes norms, values, roles, laws, 
procedures and regulations are included. There is, of course, a long economic 
tradition of thinking along these lines. Veblen made use of habits; Keynes 
made use of conventions; and Hayek made use of social rules of conduct. 6 
 
Let us establish our analysis of institutions with definitions of their basic 
component: rules. ‘Rules’ for Hodgson (2006: 18) are ‘socially transmitted and 
                                                 
5 To ‘exist’ is not simply in terms of provisioning, but also in terms of an ethical or moral existence. To 
‘know what to do’ in a given situation extends to knowing what is morally acceptable.  See Van Staveren 
(2001: chapter 7). 
6 For an interpretation of Hayek’s approach to rule following that stresses tacit knowledge, see 
Fleetwood (1995: chapter 7). 
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customary normative injunctions or immanently normative dispositions, that in 
circumstances X’; and similarly, for (Lawson 1997: 172) rules state: ‘if x do y 
under conditions z’. When a community has an established set of rules, and 
they are followed, these rules allow agents to (fallibly) render the intentions 
and actions of others (relatively) predictable, thereby allowing a degree of co-
ordination between their intentions and actions. Students and lecturers know 
that in lectures, there is a tacit, unwritten, rule that states: ‘when in the lecture 
theatre, do not interrupt the lecturer unless invited’. If this is adhered to, by 
most students, most of the time, then students and lecturers can co-ordinate 
their intentions and actions and the lecture can pass off smoothly. The term 
‘fallibly’ is important because, as all lecturers know, not all students observe 
this rule. Rules can be broken, and/or followed to varying degrees, but this is 
often sufficient for them to work. Rules facilitate practical wisdom or 
phronesis: they enable us not only to take action, but to take ‘the right’ action 
in the particular context. This version of rules has nothing in common with the 
kind of game-theoretic rules economists invent for homo economicus. Rules 
in Institutionalist thought should always be thought of as rules of thumb.  
 
Conventions according to Hodgson (2006: 18) are ‘particular instances of 
institutional rules’. Whilst all countries have traffic rules, for instance, it is a 
matter of convention whether the rule is to drive on the left or the right. Rules 
(henceforth, encapsulating conventions) are rarely singular, and the kind we 
are interested in, typically, come in sets or systems. Indeed, systems of rules 
constitute institutions. ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded 
social rules that structure social interactions’ (Hodgson 2006: 18).  
 
But in order for institutional rules to work, they must influence agents in some 
way. The question is: How? We have to tread carefully here to avoid two 
dangers. First is the danger of structural determinism, or more accurately, 
institutional determinism. Institutional rules influence agents’ intentions and 
actions, but they do not determine them. Second is the danger of assuming 
over-rationalisation, that is, assuming that agents consciously reflect upon the 
array of rules and rationally choose which one(s) to follow. As we will see in a 
moment, much of rule following is unconscious and tacit.  
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The following passage from Hodgson contains a plausible answer to the 
above question, but it is quite dense and needs careful unpacking.   
 
[R]ules are embedded because people choose to follow them 
repeatedly…[I]nstitutions work only because the rules involved are 
embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour. From this 
perspective, institutions are emergent social structures, based 
upon commonly held habits of thought: institutions are conditioned 
by and dependent upon individuals and their habits, but are not 
reducible to them. Habits are the constitutive material of institutions 
(2003: 164). 
 
To say the rules are ‘embedded’ means two things. First, they are embedded 
in the institution, in the sense that they have a history of being accepted and 
followed by most of the agents who engage with the institution. Lawson (1997: 
317-8) and Giddens (1984: 24) emphasise the relatively enduring nature of 
institutions. Second they are embedded, internalised or embodied in the 
agents. These two meanings imply something odd. If rules are embedded in 
the institution, then they are in some sense external to the agent; yet if rules 
are embedded in the agents, then they are in some sense internal to the 
agent. This is often expressed in phraseology like: rules are external and 
internal; objective and subjective; real and ideal, in the head and outside the 
head, and such like. I note this phraseology to alert the reader to other modes 
of exposition, but refrain (where possible) from using it because it invites 
confusion. 
 
The sentence, ‘the rules involved are embedded in shared habits of thought 
and behaviour’ introduces an important term, habit which, slightly changing 
Thomas and Znaniecki’s phraseology, I define as: the tendency to repeat the 
same act in similar conditions (cited in Hodgson 2003: 169). A habit should 
not be thought of as an observable behaviour, pattern, routine, action of 
outcome (in the sense noted in part one) but as a disposition, capacity or 
power that generates a tendency. Kleptomaniacs might possess the habit of 
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stealing, but this does not mean they steal all the time: sometimes they do 
and sometimes they do not. The habit is, however, always present in the form 
of a disposition generating a tendency to steal. A habit, then, is an agential 
disposition that generates a tendency for the agent to do x (see Lawson 
(1997) and Fleetwood (2001) and (2008).   
 
Notice that we have crossed an ontic divide. We started with rules as external 
to agents, and ended up with habits as dispositions internal to agents. The 
process by which this shift from external rules to internal dispositions occurs, 
is a process of habituation. ‘Habituation is the psychological mechanism by 
which individuals acquire dispositions to engage in previously adopted (rule-
like) behaviour’ (Hodgson 2006: 18). Once habits are acquired, agents act 
upon them and are, thereby, able to ‘go on’. This is why habits appear to have 
a kind of double life: they are internal and psychological phenomena, whilst 
being related to external and sociological phenomena. What Hodgson has in 
mind here is a process wherein agents begin to follow rules, perhaps 
inadvertently, and unconsciously, but constant repetition results in the 
development of a habit: when this happens, the rule becomes internalised or 
embodied in the form of a habit.7 
 
Now the process of embodiment is well known in contemporary sociological 
literature, especially in the work of Foucault and Bourdieu and their followers. 
Lopez and Scott (2000: 101) refer to ‘objective relations and institutions 
[being]…incorporated (taken into the corpse or body) as subjective 
dispositions to act’. For Elder-Vass, embodiment can be used legitimately in a 
metaphoric sense, or illegitimately in a literal sense. Writing about habitus, 
and using the term ‘structure’ where in our context it is more accurate to use 
the term ‘institution’, he writes: 
 
In this [literal] sense, when we internalize something it becomes 
literally part of us. In this sense, habitus is not merely a set of 
dispositions that has been causally influenced by our experiences 
                                                 
7 This makes habits compatible with Lawson’s (2003: 332-5) and Hodgson’s understanding. 
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of social structure. Instead habitus literally is structure, internalized 
into our bodies…Now, beliefs and dispositions are no longer 
properties of human beings who are distinct from social structures; 
rather they represent an ontological penetration of the individual by 
the social structure. On this reading, structures really are parts of 
people. (Elder-Vass: 2006: 185). 
 
The term ‘embodiment’, in the metaphoric sense, allows us to hold onto the 
ontic differentiation between agents, and social structures and institutions - 
point (a) in Hodgson’s summary of contemporary social ontology noted above. 
Rules are, and remain, external to agents, whilst habits are the internal, 
psychological (and neuro-physiological) result of rule following. Recognising 
this ontic divide allows Hodgson to write: ‘institutions are conditioned by and 
dependent upon individuals and their habits, but are not reducible to them’ 
(above).  
 
Whilst Hodgson is aware of the role played by neuro-physiology, he does not 
elaborate. 
 
To act in and adapt to the world, our complex nervous system has 
to be developed and rehearsed. It is now believed that these 
developments depend upon the evolutionary process within the 
brain, where neural connections are established, selected and 
maintained (Hodgson and passim).  
 
It is, however, hard to see how the process of habituation could not be rooted 
in neuro-physiology. Repeated practice probably triggers psychological and 
neuro-physiological processes, generating habits that become stored in our 
neural networks – which does not, of course, mean habits are reducible to 
neural networks, neurons, synaptic connection or some such. 
 
Moreover, this differentiation allows us to understand the relationship between 
the individual and the group in claims such as: ‘institutions are based upon 
commonly held habits of thought’ and ‘rules are embedded in shared habits of 
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thought’ (Hodgson cited above). It is possible to understand this now, 
because we understand not only that rules, as socially real phenomena, can 
only be common or shared, but also that rules are partly constitutive of 
institutions. ‘Habits’, according to Hodgson are ‘the constitutive material of 
institutions’. Without, I hope, altering the sentiment, it seems more accurate, 
and less prone to cause confusion, to re-phrase this sentence and write: 
rules, and their embodiment in the form of habits, are the constitutive material 
of institutions.  
 
To write, that rules are partly constitutive of institutions, brings us to the notion 
of ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ rules (Searle 2005). Regulative rules regulate 
activities that can exist independently of the rules, such as driving on the right 
hand side of the road. Constitutive rules not only regulate activities, but also 
constitute the very activities they regulate, such as the rules of chess. It is, 
however, often difficult to maintain this distinction between constitutive and 
regulative rules. According to Bhaskar (1989: 144); ‘the rules governing 
linguistic behaviour are typically constitutive of speech acts, but regulative for 
the language learner’. Transposing the context, it seems entirely plausible to 
write, for example: the rules constituting the institution of medicine, and 
governing the behaviour of health workers, are typically constitutive of 
medicine, but regulative for the health worker. For me, then, institutional rules 
are regulative and constitutive.  
 
Reconstitutive downward causation 
 
Hodgson has recently introduced one important property of institutions: they 
have the capacity of reconstitutive downward causation. Whilst it is commonly 
agreed that social structures enable and constrain agents’ intentions and 
actions, it is also believed, although less commonly, that structures cannot 
directly affect agents’ intentions and actions. Metaphorically speaking, social 
structures are not magical forces that penetrate agents’ minds and bodies, 
throwing a kind of mental switch and causing them to change their intentions. 
And yet institutions have something like this ability – although I do not   want 
to push this metaphor any further. The following comments from Hodgson 
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incorporate the points made thus far, and then extend them to the idea of 
reconstitutive downward causation: 
 
What have to be examined are the social and psychological 
mechanisms leading to such changes of preference, disposition, or 
mentality. What does happen, is the framing, shifting and 
constraining capacities of social institutions give rise to new 
perceptions and dispositions within individuals. Upon new habits of 
thought and behaviour, new preferences and intentions 
emerge…[R]econstitutive downward causation works by creating 
and moulding habits (Hodgson 2002: 170-1). 
 
The following example explains how reconstitutive downward causation 
works. 
 
For reason of cost, and a desire to minimise pollution and road 
congestion, a person may use the bus to travel to work. As a result 
of this repeated behaviour, an associated set of habits of thought 
and behaviour will be reinforced. These habits may have further 
repercussions. However, if the bus service is withdrawn, then the 
individual will be obliged to use another means of travel. It may be 
that there is no alternative to the car. The individual will then begin 
to drive to work and develop another set of habits. Even if a 
preference for public transport is maintained, it could eventually be 
undermined by repeated personal car use. The change in the 
provision of public transport can alter preferences for that mode 
(2003: 166).  
 
How exactly does repeated car use cause a new set of habits of thought and 
behaviour, leading to a preference for car use? Hodgson’s example does not 
elaborate, but it is not difficult to imagine what he has in mind. Consider the 
daily routine of finding the car keys, walking to the car, getting started, driving 
the familiar route to work, (in relative warmth, dryness, comfort and 
convenience vis-à-vis bus travellers) parking, then doing the same every 
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evening. When this goes on every day of every week of every month of every 
year, it becomes ritual, a habit. Through repeated behaviour of this kind, the 
commuter may well eventually develop a preference for car use. As Veblen 
wrote in 1908: ‘habits of thought are the outcomes of habits of life’ (Hodgson 
2004: 171). Habits, then, are not embodied consciously or actively, but sub-
consciously and passively. Even if agents were initially conscious of some 
aspect of behaviour, through repetition over time, it often retreats into our sub-
conscious. Habits are multiple, and on occasion, can lead to contradictory 
intentions and actions. To have a habit is to have a tacit skill, a ‘feel for the 
game’. Although Hodgson does not state this explicitly, it seems likely that 
habits reflect the wider social, cultural and economic environment agents find 
themselves engaging with: repeated behaviour is always context specific. As 
Hodgson (2003: 164) puts it: ‘Through their habits, individuals carry the marks 
of their own unique history’. If something like this is what Hodgson has in 
mind, then this process of habituation involves a kind of tacit knowing or 
embodiment, reminiscent of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, indeed Hodgson 
suggests this (2004: 187) and I will return to this in section three.8 Habits form 
via this process of habituation, and intentions and actions can change, entirely 
without deliberation.  
 
Whilst Hodgson does not actually, affirm or deny the following, it is possible 
that intentions and actions are sometimes caused by habit alone as he 
implies, sometimes by deliberation alone, and sometimes by a combination of 
habit and deliberation in a complex iterative process. Elder-Vass makes the 
point with his usual succinctness.  
 
[I]t might be possible that our actions are directly and non-
consciously determined by our current dispositions, while allowing 
that those dispositions are themselves the outcome of a series of 
past events. Those events include (i) very recent reflections that we 
tend to see as directly causally effective ‘decisions’; (ii) older 
                                                 
8 Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is, however, exceptionally vague. See Bourdieu (1996: chapter 3) and 
Jenkin’s (1996: chapter 4).  
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reflections that shaped our dispositions consciously at the time but 
which we may now have forgotten; and (iii) experiences that 
affected our dispositions (for example in the subliminal acquisition 
of a habit or skill) without us ever consciously deciding how’ (Elder-
Vass 2006: 175). 
 
It follows from what has been said above, then, that institutions: (a) consist of 
systems of rules, (b) are sometimes consciously, at least at first, but more 
often unconsciously, internalised or embodied as habits, (c) assist in 
coordinating agents’ intentions and actions, (d) exist independently of the 
agents who draw upon, reproduce and/or transform them, and in so-doing, 
reproduce and/or transform themselves, and (e) may, via a process of 
reconstitutive downward causation involving habituation and habit formation, 
transform the intentions and actions of these agents. This last property is 
perhaps the most crucial one in differentiating institutions from social 
structures because the latter simply do not possess this property. 9 
 
Alongside rules and conventions, however, are also norms and values, and 
they too satisfy points (b) to (e) above, strongly suggesting that institutions 
should include norms and values as well. The ambiguity surrounding the use 
of norms and values, and their relationship to rules and conventions, means 
that on some definitions, rules and conventions could be treated as identical 
to norms and value, whilst on other definitions, a distinction would have to me 
made. The safest way to deal with them in this paper is to leave them out of 
the definition of institutions – although a specific analysis of norms and values 
might well treat them as institutional. Furthermore, I also exclude roles from 
the content of institutions on the grounds that they are associated with 
organisations; and exclude laws, procedures, regulations and customs on the 
grounds that they are, typically, explicitly and consciously identified and 
followed, although they may or may not become habitual.  
 
                                                 
9 Fleetwood (2008) explains, at length, the difference between institutions, habits and reconstitutive 
downward causation on the one hand, and  social structures and agential deliberation on the other. 
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Before turning to analyse social structures, let me conclude this section, then, 
with a definition of institutions. 
 
An institution is a system of rules and conventions that assist in 
coordinating and rendering (relatively) predictable, the intentions and 
actions of agents who (systematically) draw upon, reproduce or 
transform these rules and conventions, whilst simultaneously 
reproducing and transforming themselves and who may, via a process 
of reconstitutive downward causation involving habituation and habit 
formation, have their intentions and actions transformed or changed.  
 
3. Social structures 
 
Lopez and Scott (2000) have done a significant job of work by trawling 
through over a century of sociological theory to identify three broad 
approaches to social structures which they refer to as institutional, embodied 
and relational structures. By using their comments on several social theorists, 
I will show that of the three broad approaches, only relational structures can 
really be considered as bone fide social structures; institutional structure and 
embodied structure appear to be very similar, if not identical to, what many 
would just call institutions. In the following sections I quote fairly extensively 
from their work, in order to make clear how difficult it is, even for two astute 
writers, to avoid running into problems and inconsistencies in the way certain 
crucial terms are used. By being aware of some common pitfalls, we can hope 
to avoid them in future. 
 
Institutional Structure  
 
Lopez & Scott define institutional structure as: 
 
‘Those cultural or normative patterns that define the expectations 
that agents hold about each other’s behaviour and that organize 
their enduring relations with each other.’ (Lopez & Scott 2000: 3)  
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In attempting to explain why institutional structure is a social structure, in 
many places they abandon the term ‘institutional structure’ and simply refer to 
‘social institutions’.  
 
Social institutions… are built up from the reciprocal expectations 
that people build up in their interactions. As someone observes 
another’s actions, they infer meanings and motives and they begin 
to formulate these observations into enduring assumptions about 
what others will typically do in a variety of situations…Social 
institutions, then, have a dual reality, being both subjective and 
objective (ibid: 24). 
 
Social institutions are the ‘normative patterns which define what are 
felt to be, in a given society, proper, legitimate or expected modes 
of action or of social relationship’…Institutions…form ‘predefined 
patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against 
another (ibid: 25).  
 
It is fairly clear to anyone familiar with Institutional economics that they are at 
least trying to describe institutions as systems of rules that allow agents to co-
ordinate their actions. Although they do not make much use of the term ‘rule’ it 
seems clear that they have it in mind. It is presupposed in examples they use 
such as queuing, turn-taking in conversations and collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, they argue that institutions are built from norms, and norms are 
‘rule[s] of conduct,’ (ibid: 25). They also refer to rules in the work of 
ethnomethodologists such as Cicourel (ibid: 94). 
 
The following point, however, shows where Lopez & Scott’s understanding of 
institutional structure differs from the understanding of institution I am trying to 
sustain. First, institutions are not patterns. As noted above, this confuses the 
conditions of action with the action itself. Second, Lopez and Scott do not 
mention reconstitutive downward causation, nor seem aware of the fact that 
agents’ intentions and actions might be changed by institutions. Third, for 
them, the key mechanisms through which institutions operate are not habits 
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and the process of habituation, but ‘the concept of social positions and role 
expectations’ (ibid: 29). Drawing on the work of several well known mid-
twentieth century social theorists they offer the following thoughts on social 
positions and roles:  
 
Social institutions regulate actions by defining social positions 
agents can occupy and the behaviour that is associated with these 
positions… As a part of culture, knowledge about social positions is 
held in the individual mind, but this knowledge is shared by those 
who interact together (ibid: 29). 
 
Each social position defines a role in social life for its 
occupants…Roles are definitions of those things that people are 
expected to do…They are blueprints or templates for action…They 
specify the rights and obligations that are entailed in social 
positions, and tell us what is expected of us and what we should 
expect others to do (ibid: 30). 
 
They stated above that institutions are built from norms, norms are 
synonymous with rules and norms or rules generate regular behaviour. Now it 
appears that institutions regulate behaviour by defining social positions, and 
associated roles. Roles now appear to be doing what norms previously did, 
and because, norms and rules are synonymous, then roles now appear to be 
doing what rules did. If I interpret them correctly, their understanding of social 
positions and role expectations fits with the Institutionalist understanding of 
habits and the process of habituation.  
 
Alongside norms and rules, there are social positions and roles. An agent, 
who takes up a position, inherits a set of practices. For example, a person 
who takes up the role of lecturer inherits a set of practices (e.g. teaching, 
research and administration) and a set of rules involved with these practices. 
Some rules are explicit, such as those contained in the employment contract; 
and some are implicit, such as those regulating how ‘late’ is ‘late’ in terms of a 
student who hands in a ‘late’ essay. Whether explicit of implicit, conscious or 
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unconscious, many of these rules generate a process of habituation where, 
over time, they are embodied in the form of habits. The lecturer is now an 
experienced lecturer, and these habits become a social skill that, for example, 
avoids the need to stop and weigh up the pros and cons of each ‘late’ essay. 
She immediately, and habitually, employs the embodied ‘it is only a day late’ 
rule. If this interpretation is plausible, then there seems a place for social 
positions and roles, or positioned-practices, alongside the processes of habit 
and habituation.  
 
Institutions, then, consist of rules and norms that allow those agents who draw 
upon them to co-ordinate their actions with others who do likewise. In this 
case, however, institutional structures become very similar, if not identical, to 
what many would just call institutions. The reference to ‘structures’ becomes 
redundant and, because it is likely to be cause confusion, should be dropped. 
It makes sense to explicitly recognise that institutional structures are just 
institutions, because then we can use the knowledge of reconstitutive 
downward causation, habituation and habits coming from the Institutionalist 
economics tradition, alongside positions and roles, to get a richer 
understanding of how institutions work.  
 
Embodied structure 
 
Lopez and Scott define embodied structure as: 
 
‘The habits and skills that are inscribed in human bodies and minds 
and that allow them to produce, reproduce, and transform 
institutional structures and relational structures.’ (Lopez & Scott 
2000: 4)  
 
We established above that institutional rules are, and remain, external to 
agents, whilst habits are the internal, psychological and neuro-physiological 
result of a process of habituation. There is, however, no similar process by 
which social structures can be internalised or embodied. To return to a 
previous metaphor, social structures are not magical forces that penetrate 
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agents’ minds and bodies, throwing a kind of mental switch and causing them 
to change their intentions. Social structures are, and remain, external to 
agents. Lopez and Scott draw upon Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in an attempt 
to show how social structures are embodied. Because habitus is roughly 
equivalent to Hodgson’s notion of habit, what is required is an elaboration of a 
process that would do for social structures, what habituation does for 
institutions. Yet, because nothing like a process of habituation is offered, their 
account of embodiment runs into two problems: (i) it is difficult to make sense 
of; and (ii) where sense can be made of it, it borders on structural 
determinism. Here we need to remind ourselves of Elder-Vass’s distinction 
between metaphoric and literal senses of embodiment. Scott and Lopez, are 
getting very close to a literal reading, implying that: ‘habitus literally is 
structure, internalized into our bodies’ or implying the ‘ontological penetration 
of the individual by the social structure’ as Elder-Vass put it above. Let us 
consider a passage from Lopez & Scott where they are explaining the ‘class 
habitus’ which following Bourdieu they define as ‘the internalized form of class 
condition’. A class habitus: 
 
‘Is the result of the particular experiences and opportunities shared 
by those who occupy a particular class position. It is because 
people acquire a class-specific habitus that there are similar 
patterns of class action in various fields of activity; and it is 
because of these similar objective patterns that they acquire the 
habitus. Politics, leisure, religion, art, and so on all show similar 
patterns of class behaviours when they are the results of (and 
therefore the conditions for) the application of class 
habituses…Individuals acquire these systems of classification and 
social behaviour without realizing that they are doing so.’ (ibid: 104-
5) 
 
If ‘individuals acquire these systems of classification and social behaviour 
without realizing that they are doing so’ the question is: How? What is needed 
is an explanation of the mechanism(s) by which the particular experiences 
and opportunities shared by those who occupy a particular class position 
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result in this class habitus. Is the mechanism the similar objective patterns of 
behaviour? Maybe, but how exactly do patterns, which are external to the 
agent, become internalized or embodied? Is the mechanism the act of sharing 
things like experiences and opportunities? Maybe, but what exactly is it about 
sharing that has this effect? Without an explanation of the (conscious or 
unconscious) processes by which agents come to embody external forces, 
Lopez and Scott are left flirting ambiguously with social structures as ‘magic 
forces’ that somehow ‘ontologically penetrate agents’ – which is not, I am 
sure, their intention. Moreover, structural determinism looms large vis-à-vis 
the claim that the particular experiences and opportunities shared by those 
who occupy a particular class position result in a class habitus. This comes 
close to suggesting that the development of particular class intentions and the 
undertaking of particular class actions are determined by the shared particular 
experiences which are a product of being brought up with particular social 
structures. I freely admit that this may not be what Lopez and Scott believe. 
But ambiguity, coupled with, or even deriving from, the lack of an explanation 
of the mechanisms or processes by which agents come to embody external 
forces, leads in this direction.  
 
The way out of this tangle is to interpret (class) habitus to mean habits (of 
persons of a certain class, or indeed gender or generation and so on) and 
make use of the process of habituation through which habits are formed to 
explain the psychological and neuro-physiological mechanisms by which 
social structures may be embodied. But then we need to recognise that we 
are dealing with institutions, or institutionalised rules, not social structures or 
institutional structures.  
 
We started with a definition of embodied structure consisting of ‘the habits and 
skills that are inscribed in human bodies and minds’. But to make sense of the 
notion of embodiment, we had to use the processes of habituation through 
which habits are formed. And this makes embodied structures very similar, if 
not identical, to what many would just call institutions. Referring to embodied 
structures as institutions, adds to the confusion between social structures and 
institutions. It makes sense to recognise that embodied structures are just 
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institutions, because then we can bring the knowledge of habituation and 
habits, coming from the Institutionalist economics tradition into the picture to 
get a richer understanding of how institutional rules are embodied. 
 
Relational Structure 
 
Lopez & Scott define relational structure as:  
 
‘The social relations themselves, understood as patterns of causal 
interconnection and interdependence among agents and their 
actions, as well as the positions that they occupy.’ (Lopez & Scott 
2000: 3)  
 
In contrast to arguing that institutional structures and embodied structures are 
better understood as institutions, I will argue that relational structures are 
bone fide social structures. The idea of relational structure does not, however, 
come without its critics. And one such critic is Elder-Vass who observes that 
relational structure:  
 
‘Can refer to the whole entity that is structured by the relations 
between its parts, which I shall call structure-as-whole, or it can 
refer to the way that a group of things (generally the parts of a 
whole) is related to each other, which I shall call structure-as-
relations.’ (Elder-Vass 2006: 100. See also Elder Vass 2007b) 
 
Treating social structure as structure-as-relations means rejecting its causal 
efficacy because, he argues, relations themselves are not causally 
efficacious: only their relata are. Treating social structure as structure-as-
whole, restores causal efficacy, but it also means that social structure 
becomes synonymous with some whole entity such as an institution or 
organisation, thereby denying any difference between structure (as structure-
as-whole) and institutions – or organisations. This is not a problem for my 
argument, because it is in-keeping with the idea that institutional and 
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embodied structures are better understood as institutions.10 I will say nothing 
more about structure-as-whole, and turn to consider structure-as-relations in 
more depth. Let me start with Elder-Vass’s argument. 
 
[R]relations as such can have no causal effect on the world. It is 
only when actual entities are related that the set of entities so 
related can have an effect; and, as I have shown in chapter three, 
when we claim that a set of lower-level entities and the stable 
substantial relations between them have a causal effect, this is 
synonymous with claiming that there is a higher-level entity formed 
from these parts and relations that is the causally effective element. 
Ultimately, then, the idea that structures have causal effects is 
incoherent if structure is taken to mean structures-as-relations and 
not structures-as-wholes (Elder-Vass 2006: 100, emphasis added) 
 
Two key phrases make Elder-Vass’s argument compelling. First is his claim 
that: ‘relations as such can have no causal effect on the world. It is only when 
actual entities are related that the set of entities so related can have an effect’. 
Second, is Ollman’s worry that a focus solely on relations between things, 
without the things themselves, might lead to reification of the term ‘between’ 
(cited in Elder-Vass 2006: 56). I must admit, this threw me for a while until in a 
discussion, a colleague11 pointed out that there is no such thing as a ‘relation 
as such’, or a relation without relata. There can be no ‘between’ if there are no 
things ‘either side’ as it were. Of course a ‘relation as such’ has no causal 
efficacy, but this is because it is not real – although ambiguous phraseology 
might suggest or imply otherwise. Is there a sense in which relation-as-
structure can be rescued by abandoning the misleading idea of a ‘relation as 
such’ and allowing that relations are always relations between things? I think 
there is.  
                                                 
10 Elder Vass (2007b 470-1) does not want to equate social structures and institutions, and he gives a 
relatively lengthy exposition of a social institution as the causal power of a group norm. I hesitate to 
draw further on his work in pursuit of the meaning of institutions because this is not the main focus of his 
work. 
11 I would like to thank Filipe Sousa for this insight. 
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The roots of a plausible notion of structure-as-relations lies in what Elder-Vass 
(2006: 55) previously attributed to Collier who writes that: ‘The latticework of 
relations constitutes the structure of “society”’. For Elder-Vass, ‘the latticework 
of relations constitutes structure (i.e. the mode of organisation)’. I assume this 
means that the relations constitute the mode of organisation or even ‘the way 
a group of things or people relate’ (Elder-Vass 2006: 100). It might be less 
confusing to treat structure-as-relation as a latticework of relations, with 
different latticework’s referring to different ways in which the parts relate. We 
would then be able to differentiate between relational structures because we 
could differentiate between latticeworks.  
 
If the relations between a set of unchanging things are altered and new, 
systematic and stable relations emerge, then the entity will become a different 
one. The change will be caused solely by changes in the relations. We could 
identify a different latticework, a different way in which the parts relate. 
Imagine a scenario wherein an unemployed person contemplates offering her 
labour power on the labour market, and an employer contemplates hiring 
labour power. At the stage of contemplation, when the two parties are 
unaware of each other, are totally unrelated, each has causal powers X and Y 
respectively, and these powers exist independently of any relation between 
them. If the two parties are brought together via the labour market and an 
employment contract is signed, then at this point, a very definite relationship 
emerges: an employment relation. Indeed, at this point, the relations between 
them become internal relations. 
  
Notice that the employment relation is a very definite or particular one. The 
employee and employer may be related in terms of being family, friends, or 
supporting the same football club, but these relations are not the same as the 
employment relation, they constitute a different latticework. If the way the 
people relate should change, that is, if the relations should change, people 
would act differently. If, for example, the employer married the employee and 
the latter ceased work, then the employment relation would disappear and a 
different relation, a family relation, would emerge. The relations that we are 
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focussing upon in this example, those that constitute the employment relation, 
are not external, but internal relations – i.e. where the nature of one of the 
relata, depends upon the nature of the other, landlord and tenant would be 
another example. This is important, because not any old relata can be 
internally related: the employer-employee relations cannot be an employment 
relation if, for example, the employee quits to become a subcontracted 
worker, whilst continuing to carry out the same tasks she previously did.   
 
Now, has the relation (between things) caused anything? The employee, who 
previously had causal powers X, now has additional causal power X1 - e.g. 
the power to purchase goods with wages. The employer, who previously had 
causal powers Y, now has additional causal power Y1 - e.g. the power to 
produce extra products with the additional labour. What is the cause of these 
additional causal powers? There are (at least) three possibilities: 
 
a) The cause of the additional powers could be the employment 
relation, the way the people are organised or related.  
b) The cause of the additional powers could be something involved in 
creating the relationship, like the employment contract or the 
workplace.  
c) The cause of the additional powers could be something to do with 
the act of transferring resources. The employer transfers wages 
(which was part of Y) to the employee and the employee transfers 
the control of labour power to the employer (which was part of X).  
 
Cause (b) seems to depend upon cause (a) in the sense that the employment 
contract depends upon the employment relation; indeed, the contract officially 
registers the existence of the relation. No employment relation, no 
employment contract. Cause (c) also seems to depend on cause (a). The 
resources without the transfer, and hence without the relation, remain in their 
original locations and cannot become additional causal powers. No 
employment relation, no transfer, no resources.  By default, then, we are left 
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with cause (a) and can, I think, conclude that employment relations, as an 
example of (social) relations more generally, are causally efficacious.12 
 
In sum, then, having abandoned the misleading idea of a ‘relation as such’ 
and recognised that relations are always relations between things, I conclude 
that: (social) relations are causal; (social) relations are emergent entities; 
structure-as-relation is plausible and so, therefore, is relational structure. 
Unlike institutional structures, embodied structures and also structure-as-
whole, which are all more accurately interpreted as institutions, relational 
structure, qua structure-as-relation, is a bone fide social structure. These 
observations allow me to conclude this section, then, with the following 
definition:   
 
A social structure is a latticework of internal relations between entities 
that may enable and constrain (but cannot transform or change) the 
intentions and actions of agents who draw upon, reproduce and/or 
transform these relations.13   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that, on the one hand, institutions and structures share 
similarities. The three-fold distinction between (i) agents; (ii) social structures 
and institutions; and (iii) actions or outcomes illustrates how agents who 
engage with structures and institutions are enabled to act, and in so acting 
reproduce or transform not only the structures and institutions, but also 
themselves. Social structures and institutions, then, are the conditions of 
human action, they make human action possible. The paper has also shown 
that, on the other hand, institutions and structures have two important 
differences. First, institutions are systems of rules and conventions, whereas 
social structures are latticeworks of internal relations between entities. 
Second, institutions contribute to a process of reconstitutive downward 
                                                 
12 This is in-keeping with Porpora (2007: 196-7) 
13 This is in-keeping with Porpora (1998: 344) and (2007:198). 
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causation involving habituation and habit formation whereby agents’ intentions 
and actions are transformed or changed, whereas social structures enable 
and constrain, but cannot transform or change, agents’ intentions and actions. 
Recognising these similarities and differences between institutions and social 
structures has allowed us to take another small step in the task of clarifying 
the meaning of these important terms.   
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